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Abstract 
This paper seeks to evaluate local government policies to promote the 
development of residential space in center city downtowns. Specifically, it aims to 
outline two common policy approaches and analyze the financial and regulatory 
impact of those policies in the context of local market dynamics. Houston and 
Washington, DC serve as case studies to examine tax abatement and zoning 
strategies, respectively.  Additionally, financial analysis of a hypothetical project is 
used to allow for the direct comparison of these policies and their effect on various 
parties. Based on the findings of this report, market conditions for residential space, 
public finances, and the local political climate are particularly important in 
determining the most applicable policy for a city looking to promote downtown 
residential space. 
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Introduction 
The past two decades have seen a resurgence of growth in major cities across 
the United States. After years of decline and population loss in places like 
Washington, Denver, and Philadelphia, these cities saw their populations stabilize 
and begin growing again. Between 2010 and 2011, growth in center cities of metro 
areas in the U.S. outpaced that of their outlying suburbs for the first time in more 
than nine decades (Frey, 2012).  Primary to the resurgence is the continued 
revitalization of downtown areas. A central component of this revitalization is the 
inclusion of residential units, which help bring with them street activity, vibrancy, 
and a sense of community (Birch, 2000).  
In addition to the desire of residents for walkable downtown living, 
municipalities also have a strong interest in promoting the development of 
downtown housing. In doing so, they work to increase their economic and social 
wellbeing through enhanced regional competitiveness and quality of life. Creating 
vibrant neighborhoods where people desire to live, work, and play is widely seen as 
a key to attracting employers and investment dollars to an area. 
Oftentimes, despite the municipal desire to encourage housing downtown 
and a demand for units there by residents, there exists a lack of housing in 
downtown areas. This is particularly true in well-established cities that have 
retained a strong employment center. Financial barriers due to land values or 
pricing for CBD office space make residential projects financially infeasible or 
uninteresting to a developer who does not see it as the most profitable use of land. 
But that valuation on the part of developers ignores the community and economic 
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benefits to be gained in transforming nine to five neighborhoods into more active 
“18 hour” or “24 hour” areas.  
A number of cities have recognized this issue and sought to address it in 
some capacity. Since the 1990’s, city leaders from across the country have 
implemented strategies to incentivize and promote the development of downtown 
housing. Approaches range from office space conversion to new construction and 
methods of making financing more attractive through the use of tax abatements, 
bonus density offerings, and various other subsidies (Birch, 2007). However, while 
these various systems exist, few have explored the topic in the context of how a city 
looking to increase residential space downtown may approach it from a financing 
perspective.  Little information exists on the overall effectiveness of these policies, 
both in considering the cost to municipalities (via subsidies, incentives, or other 
means of financial support) as well as their success in actually creating new 
residential spaces.  
This paper seeks to provide context to evaluating public involvement in 
promoting residential space downtown. Specifically, it aims to address the following 
questions: 
 What are the most common finance tools or development policies that are 
employed when trying to implement a downtown residential strategy? 
 How effective have strategies put in place by municipalities been in creating 
new residential space? Are certain strategies more cost effective than others? 
Do some more easily facilitate the development of new housing? 
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In doing so, this report will provide a better understanding of the complexities of 
downtown residential space and provide a base from which to assess how 
municipalities can evaluate the most effective means to further downtown 
residential growth. 
Organization 
 This report begins by examining the concept of bid rent and spatial land use 
patterns to understand market behavior and financial barriers to downtown 
residential financial feasibility.  I then outlines the benefits of downtown residential 
space, looking specifically at why a municipality would be interested in incentivizing 
it. To provide historical context, I will examine the evolution of downtowns, 
highlighting their decline in the latter half of the twentieth century and resurgence 
as centers of regional activity in recent years. With this understanding, I will then 
look at case studies of policy approaches used by two cities, Houston and 
Washington, DC, to address these financial barriers and promote an increase of 
residential units downtown. Finally, I will work through a financial analysis of a 
hypothetical project in Washington, DC to highlight the difference in value between 
office and residential space under market conditions and evaluate the financial 
impact of applied policies.  
As a note, this report focuses only on the addition of market rate housing in 
downtown areas. While affordable housing is an important tool in building more 
equitable neighborhoods, particularly in downtown areas that tend to be more 
expensive than other neighborhoods, its implementation involves policies, 
incentives, and programs that are separate from those discussed here.  
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The Case for Downtown Residential Space 
Land Use and Land Value Dynamics 
 The American central city downtown is typically the center of business 
activity in a region. The Financial District in Manhattan or the Loop in Chicago 
generally bring to mind images of corporate employees and large office buildings. 
Office space is the dominant land use in these districts aside from retailers 
occupying some ground floor space. Noticeably absent until recent years was a 
concentration of residential units. Why has the growth of residential space not been 
more prevalent downtown? The primary barrier is that the value of residential 
space is lower than the value of office space in most downtown markets. Barring 
some rare exceptions such as Vancouver, which has a particularly strong residential 
market (Lazarus, 2005), office space can generally garner higher rents downtown 
than residential space in the same location.  This is particularly true in cities with 
well-established and strong office markets.  
Classical theory on land values via the bid rent model offers a relatively 
simple explanation for the ability of office space to price out residential space. The 
bid rent model looks at how land values and willingness to pay for land varies by 
location, with the highest prices located in the downtown hub and prices steadily 
decreasing as one moves further away from the city center (Alonso, 1964).  In the 
model, different land users (retail, office, residential, industrial, etc…) compete with 
one another for land that is closest to the city center, as it is most accessible and 
therefore theoretically the most desirable. Land is assigned to its highest and best 
use, with each person considering the positive and negative attributes in locating in 
a particular place. The entities willing and able to pay the most for a particular 
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property will gain control of the land for their desired use. As one moves further 
from the city center, diminished value of land to core users allows other land uses to 
occupy that space. Under the classical model, retail and office users are willing to 
pay the most, or have the highest “bid-rent”, for space in the center of the city. This 
makes sense considering that it is extremely important for these users to be 
accessible to as many residents, employees, and other businesses as possible. 
Beyond the center, manufacturers locate further out and residents beyond that.  
A subsequent concept that built on bid rent theory is the sector model 
developed by economist Homer Hoyt. Like the bid rent curve, the model distributes 
land uses in a geographic area based on bid rent users are willing to pay (Hoyt, 
1939). However, it differs in that it takes into account socioeconomic status of 
residents, with different socioeconomic classes congregating on different sides of 
the city. Still, the sector model, like bid rent theory, shows that resident locate on the 
outskirts of the city while retail and office uses have the highest bid rent and occupy 
the city center. 
Edward Glaeser applies pieces of this theory to realities that exist within 
markets in his article, “The Economic Approach to Cities”. He looks at labor and 
housing as it relates to the economic model of the city, explaining the equilibrium 
for supply and demand of housing and when fluctuations in that equilibrium allow 
new housing units to be built. However, Glaeser considers housing as the singular 
land use when evaluating housing dynamics. In reality, particularly within 
downtown areas, housing is generally competing with other uses. Within any mixed-
use area, the spatial competition among land uses adds another layer of complexity 
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to analysis determining when new housing is supportable given market demand.  
Despite demand for housing, new supply may be impeded by higher values for 
alternative land uses.  
While land use is far more nuanced in reality than these models depict and 
land use dynamics have changed over time with advances in technology and 
evolving forms of transportation, the central idea behind these theories prove to be 
an important point when considering land uses downtown:  certain users are able 
and willing to pay more to be in particular locations.  However, it is critical to realize 
that when land users are assessing their willingness to pay for a particular property, 
they are only taking into account the value of the land to themselves. Their valuation 
and subsequent willingness to pay for a property ignores community and economic 
benefits that come with varied land use.  
Why build residential space downtown?  
Each year, the Urban Land Institute (ULI), in partnership with Price 
Waterhouse Cooper, publishes a report on Emerging Trends in Real Estate. With the 
release of the 2015 report, it named “The 18-Hour City Comes of Age” as the top 
emerging trend. The report states: 
“…deep into the evening the mix of shops, restaurants, and entertainment 
truly generates excitement. This is catalyzed by walk-to-work housing that 
encourages employers in the knowledge and talent industries to keep their 
offices downtown…the model has demonstrated that the right urban mix 
bolsters occupancy, density raises values, and that vibrancy attracts 
investment capital.” 
 
 
This description varies significantly from the typical central city in America 
during the latter half of the twentieth century. Downtowns then were generally a 
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“nine to five” environment comprised mostly of office and government uses, with a 
small amount of retail to cater to office workers daytime needs (Leinberger, 2005). 
Workers would come into the city in the morning from the suburbs, put in their time 
in the office, and then leave at the end of the day. This meant small bursts of activity 
for a short time twice a day, but little to no activity at night and on weekends. 
However, as far back as the work of Jane Jacobs in the early 1960’s, city planners 
recognized the benefits to vibrancy like that described above by ULI that mixed-use 
pedestrian friendly development could provide. With a variety of buildings used for 
different purposes, streets are more activated with people coming and going at all 
times of day, a stronger neighborhood character can develop, and people tend to feel 
safer with “eyes on the street” (Jacobs, 1961). 
The ULI report makes an important connection between the relationship of 
downtown residential space and office space, noting that downtown and downtown 
adjacent housing incentivizes knowledge and talent industries to locate their offices 
downtown. With the large number of millenials living in urban environments and 
seeking housing a short distance from their job, companies that employ large 
numbers of young and educated workers see a competitive advantage in locating 
downtown. In doing so, they can attract top talent that is likely not interested in 
working in a suburban office park. This bolsters the demand for downtown office 
space, making downtown housing beneficial not only from a vibrancy standpoint, 
but also to the broader downtown office market and economy. 
A 2013 study of preferred office locations compared performance of various 
office locations and validated the notion that employers place a higher value on 
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locating in vibrant and amenity rich areas with a “live, work, play” atmosphere 
(Malizia, 2014). The most direct comparison the study offers on vibrancy compares 
single-use suburban office space to suburban office space in vibrant areas that offer 
multi-use, walkable environments. Though the focus of the comparison is on 
suburban spaces rather than downtown environments, it nonetheless offers a 
comparison of spaces in which the primary difference is mixed-use vibrancy. Asking 
rents for office space in mixed-use centers was found to be $3.39/sq. foot higher 
than single-use office parks, a 14.6% difference. Additionally, vacancy rates in 
mixed-use centers was 4.5% lower than equivalent single-use office parks. These 
figures point to the strength of the office market in live, work, play environments, 
with office tenants showing a willingness to pay more to be located in vibrant 
centers. All things equal, there is reason to believe that vibrancy downtown also has 
positive effects on the office market there. With the understanding that downtown 
housing helps to promote vibrancy downtown and that vibrancy in turn can help to 
create a stronger downtown office market, housing can be seen as an indirect but 
important component for economic development. It is therefore in the interest of 
local government to ensure that there is an adequate supply of downtown and 
downtown adjacent housing. 
Focus on the development of successful downtowns by city governments is 
critical not only for the benefit to central business districts, but also because the 
success of central city downtowns has broader economic implications on the rest of 
the city and even metro area. Vibrant and active downtowns enhance the regional 
competitiveness of a city and improve the general economic health of a region 
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(Leinberger, 2005). The success of suburbs is tied to the success of their central city 
(Goetzman, Spiegal, Wachter, 1998). Housing markets in suburban areas are closely 
tied to their central city, meaning that the success of downtown directly impacts the 
success of the rest of the entire metropolitan area.  Additionally, vibrant downtowns 
project an image of the city to outsiders, which can also play an important role in 
attracting employers and new residents to locate there. 
Decline and Resurgence of Central Cities 
In the wake of World War II, there was a huge demand for housing 
(Moulton, 1999) across the United States. Beginning with the great depression in the 
1930’s and continuing with the World War through the early 1940’s, very little 
housing was built for almost 20 years. This created pent-up demand that, along with 
a rapidly growing middle class, provided for the foundations of a building boom. 
However, for a number of reasons, the shape of development that occurred during 
this time was far different from the existing environment. The most notable change 
from the prior building boom of the 1920’s was the widespread adoption of the 
automobile, which enabled people to move to less expensive and newly built tract 
housing beyond city limits in the suburbs while still having relatively easy access to 
the city. At the same time, restrictive mortgage policies on the part of lenders 
favored these new suburban homes over city dwellings and federal housing policies 
were structured to promote homeownership, which was generally more attainable 
in the suburbs. Lastly, tense race relations hastened “white flight” from cities out to 
the suburbs, particularly in the 1960’s after riots following the death of Martin 
Luther King Jr.  
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To clarify, residential space historically was not concentrated in downtown 
itself (Birch, 2009). Rather, residential neighborhoods were most often located 
adjacent to and nearby downtown. For example, sociologist Gerald Breese noted in 
the 1940’s that the six thousand residents of the Loop in Chicago paled in 
comparison to the more than one million people that came to the Loop each day to 
work or shop (Breese, 1949). Still though, residents in these adjacent 
neighborhoods could easily get to the downtown concentration of office, 
commercial, and entertainment space.  
As people moved beyond city limits and into the suburbs, retailers began to 
follow. Department stores, whose flagship location had almost always been located 
in central downtown locations, began opening new branch stores in the suburbs to 
be closer to customers (Birch, 2009). Suburban shopping malls quickly became the 
new center of retail in a metro area, giving people who did not work downtown little 
reason to go there. Downtown office space fared somewhat better during this time 
than retail space due to the need for many industries to be located close to 
government and other businesses that were also downtown, but cities still lost 
share of office space to suburban locations over time.  
Cities began to recognize the outflow of population and seek strategies to 
help reverse the losses. In considering the prevalence of automobiles, city leaders 
sought out means to better accommodate cars downtown. Many central cities were 
able to take advantage of funding from the Federal Highway Act (1956) to construct 
freeways around downtowns and older buildings downtown were knocked down to 
construct surface parking lots (Birch, 2009).  However, as Birch points out, these 
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actions that intended to improve access to downtown actually tended to do more 
harm than good. Highways often divided neighborhoods and surface lots reduced 
the density and urban fabric of the city. As a result, suburbanization only increased 
further.  
Beginning in the 1980’s, many developers turned their focus downtown to 
the development of new office space. Cities, welcoming any potential investment 
and hoping for a spark that could help ignite growth, created plans that 
incorporated space for a large growth in office use (Birch, 2009). Though downtown 
office space was losing share slowly to the suburbs, it was still in many ways the 
land use that had fared best against suburbanization. As mentioned above, there 
were competitive advantages in locating downtown for many industries. 
Additionally, many employers saw downtown as a logical location since employees 
traveled from all different parts of the metro area to get to work. However, the new 
construction did not stem the slow transition away from downtowns as the 
dominant office form. Despite many tenants moving from other buildings in the city 
into these new buildings, little new growth resulted from these projects (Birch, 
2009). On top of this, a period of overbuilding across the real estate market created 
large amounts of vacancy, particularly in older buildings now largely seen as 
obsolete or in need of a major overhaul given the new supply of office space that 
now existed.  
City leaders were faced with the issue of how to repurpose the excess and 
obsolete former office space (Beauregard, 2005). Focus shifted toward converting 
these spaces into residential units as a means to shore up the office vacancy. As we 
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will explore in later sections, the idea for residential space downtown was not a new 
one, but it was not until this time that its use gained traction. Programs such as the 
Lower Manhattan Revitalization Plan (1995) in New York were put into place to aid 
in the conversion and benefits of having residential space downtown became more 
evident. What began as a means to fill old office space was quickly realized to hold 
much more potential in creating vibrant environments.  
At the same time this push to convert downtown office space to residential 
was being made, there was a shift in demographics and lifestyle preferences among 
certain segments of the population that favored a more urban lifestyle (Moulton, 
1999). This shift is working to bring attention back to downtowns as the center of 
activity within a city or region. Considering demographics, the number of 
households without children is increasing and young adults are, on average, 
marrying later in life (Nelson, 2009). These childless and single young adult 
households generally desire more maintenance-free living close to neighborhood 
amenities like restaurants and shops. Additionally, living preferences among the 
general population indicate a desire for more walkable locations that do not always 
necessitate use of a car. These factors favor urban living and have led city leaders 
across the country to initiate strategies that would help facilitate the growth of 
downtown housing. 
Strategies to Incorporate Residential Growth Downtown 
Six strategies have been identified as ways in which municipalities may work to 
promote residential growth in central cities (Birch, 2007): 
 Adaptive re-use of office buildings, factories, or warehouses 
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 Buildings on “new” land such as reclaimed waterfronts (i.e. Battery Park City 
in New York City) 
 Redeveloped public housing through HOPE VI projects 
 Creating mixed-use projects that are able to incorporate some amount of 
residential units 
 Targeting niche markets, such as students or seniors 
 Using historic preservation to promote residential use 
 
Some of these methods are less appropriate in a downtown setting. For example, a 
number of factors would likely limit the ability of a HOPE IV projects be located in 
the downtown district of a city. Still, this list provides a helpful understanding of 
how residential space may be included in a central city outside of a standard ground 
up residential development. The adaptive re-use of buildings historically used for 
other purposes has received the most attention and been analyzed in several 
different contexts. The obsolescence of antiquated office space and general decline 
of industrial uses in central cities makes these buildings prime for conversion to 
other uses as an alternative to being knocked down. As an example of this strategy, 
New York City implemented the Lower Manhattan Revitalization Plan (LMRP) in 
1995 as a means to put empty office buildings to better use as well as move the area 
away from its dependence on financial services sector office users (Beauregard, 
2005). New office space in the area had relatively low vacancy, but there existed a 
glut of old office space in which tenants were not interested. As a response, the city 
passed legislation that permitted and provided subsidies for the conversion of old 
office buildings downtown into residential units. The result was a nearly 40% 
increase in population in the area between 1990 and 2000.  
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Though many municipalities have seen success with the promotion of a 
building conversion strategy, it is also important to understand its limitations. While 
some cities have a large stock of old buildings with potential for conversion, many 
do not. On top this, not all antiquated structures may be conducive to conversion. 
The ability for a building to be converted into residential use depends largely on the 
size of floorplates of the structure and other design features. This may be a practical 
strategy to some extent, but is unlikely to be a complete solution for cities whose 
primary goal is to increase vibrancy and diversity of uses. 
While all of the methods addressed by Birch (2007) can be employed by 
cities to encourage residential growth, they do not directly address the land use 
value problem that exists in many places or means of overcoming financing gaps. An 
important consideration with any strategy, and the focus of this project, is 
understanding the means of financing new residential units. Looking at specific 
examples of policies can begin to offer insight into how those policies impact the 
financial structure of projects. For example, the LMRP legislation required 
involvement of future city funds to developers to account for the lower value of land 
when used as residential space. Developers converting old office space received a 14 
year tax abatement on the project, making what would otherwise be an unprofitable 
project into one that was attractive to developers and investors (Birch, 2007). But 
how was this abatement structured in such a way that would encourage property 
owners to act and how did it compare to alternative strategies to finance the 
development of residential units? Further research will help to illustrate how 
policies like this address the financial gap that exists between office and residential 
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uses. Considering these barriers to development, we can look at strategies cities 
have employed thus far in adding to the housing stock of their downtown and the 
financial impact of these strategies to both municipalities and the private sector. 
Methodology 
The remainder of this paper is divided into two sections. The first is a case 
study analysis of Houston, Texas and Washington, DC to analyze and evaluate 
policies in place there to encourage residential space downtown. The policies are 
assessed on structure, goals, implementation, and impact. Data gathered is largely 
qualitative, based on the review of documents and interviews with planers and 
policymakers. Interviews provided context not available through written documents 
on the policies. All interviewees currently or previously worked in city government 
or associated organizations and have first-hand experience working directly with 
the residential policies.  
Houston and Washington, DC were selected as case studies because each 
uses one of the two most common policy approaches to creating downtown 
residential space. Houston employs a tax-based policy that uses tax abatements on 
completed projects to incentivize development. In contrast, the policy in DC is 
primarily zoning-based and provides incentives related to bonus densities. The two 
programs were initiated for similar reasons, namely the desire to increase vibrancy 
and activity downtown. Evaluating the policies of two cities seeking to increase their 
downtown residential population via different strategies will provide valuable 
information about how these policies work, issues they faced in implementation, 
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and their effectiveness. The findings of this analysis will also be useful to other cities 
seeking to address downtown vibrancy through a residential policy. 
 In the final section of this report, I will analyze the financial impact of the two 
policy approaches by applying them to a hypothetical project. Because real estate 
markets conditions vary from region to region, applying the policies in a uniform 
situation helps to more directly compare their financial impact relative to one 
another. The analysis is quantitative, completed with the creation of financial pro 
forma models for the development in DC. Actual market conditions there are used to 
develop a base line scenario of project viability with no residential policy. Tax-based 
and zoning-based policies are then applied to determine the amount of money 
necessary to make residential space viable and the level of involvement from public 
and private sides. The localized nature of this analysis makes financial results 
specific to Washington, DC. However, the concepts and practices used to apply these 
policies can be applied elsewhere to determine the effect of policies on market 
conditions in any given location. 
Case Studies of Two Current Policies 
Houston Downtown Living Initiative 
An increased focus on residential space in downtown Houston was brought 
about through the development of the Downtown Living Initiative Program (DLIP), 
initiated by action of the City of Houston as well as numerous groups associated 
with Downtown Houston including the Houston Downtown Management District 
(HDMD).  A primary driver of the program was the desire to increase vibrancy 
downtown by “getting [residential] rooftops in downtown Houston” (Houston 
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Chronicle, 2012). Historically, Houston, like many other Sun Belt cities, has had a 
very small population in its downtown core. According to current estimates, the 
area has a population of approximately 3,600 (Houston Downtown Management 
District, 2015). The city and HDMD viewed the lack of commercial activity, 
particularly in the eastern portion of downtown in the area around the George R. 
Brown Convention Center, as problematic and indicative of the lack of vibrancy in 
the area. Official believed that attracting residents could help address this problem 
and drive demand for new commercial activity in what they viewed as underutilized 
land, occupied by parking lots and less dense uses (Interview, January 23rd, 2015). 
However, the prevailing market rate apartment rents at the time made development 
of residential space downtown infeasible given the cost of land and construction 
there. In order to create an environment in which residential development would be 
feasible to a private developer, the city decided to implement the DLIP. The 
program, which started in 2012, was initially designed to create 2,500 new units, 
but was expanded in 2014 to 5,000 units after high developer interest. It reached 
that 5,000 unit cap in August of 2014 and has since been put on hold to allow for the 
construction and absorption of those units. In addition to the financial incentives 
made available to encourage residential development, the program also includes a 
number of aesthetic guidelines, which helped provide the city with increased 
authority over the final design of projects to ensure buildings that promoted a 
walkable environment (DLIP Program Description, 2012).  
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Overview of Policy 
Real estate has a high degree of geographic heterogeneity. Real estate 
markets and the policies that affect them vary significantly from place to place. As a 
result, no two markets can be viewed in quite the same way. Houston is unique from 
a planning perspective in that it has no zoning code. It is the largest city in the 
United States without such a code and the lack of ability to require a particular use 
on a property eliminates the ability of the city government to use any policy tools 
related to zoning to encourage residential development. As a result, the housing 
incentive program in downtown Houston is centered on the use of tax abatement. 
Even in municipalities with zoning codes, tax abatements are a popular tool to 
incentivize development projects. 
Under the DLIP policy, a developer is eligible to receive a tax abatement of up 
to $15,000 per residential unit constructed (DLIP Program Description, 2012). 
During the planning stages of a project, the developer applies for and receives 
approval to be included within the program. Once the project is constructed, the 
owner receives a 75% reimbursement per year on the incremental City of Houston 
property tax as well as the HDMD incremental assessment for the first fifteen years 
after the project’s completion (without exceeding the $15,000 limit per unit). To put 
this in real terms, a 200-unit apartment building would be able to receive up to 
$3,000,000 dollars in reimbursed taxes over the course of its first fifteen years of 
operation. Incentives on that scale significantly affect the financial outlook for a 
project and have the potential to make a project that was not previously financially 
feasible much more attractive.  
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Figure 1 shows the area included in DLIP. It encompasses the entirety of 
what is traditionally considered downtown Houston, including the office core, the 
Historic District, three major sports facilities, and the George R. Brown Convention 
Center (DLIP Update, 2014). The program was initially focused on the eastern 
portion of downtown near the convention center, where there is a higher 
concentration of properties the city believed to be underutilized. That area is 
generally seen as a less desirable location for office space compared to the western 
portion of downtown (Interview, January 23rd, 2015). Additionally, increasing the 
number of residents in this area would create more vibrancy around the convention 
center, helping to create more of a neighborhood feel, drive demand that could 
support retail space, and generally improve conditions in the area to create a more 
pleasant experience for convention guests.  
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Figure 1: Area of Downtown Living Initiative Program Area, Downtown 
Houston 
  
Source: City of Houston 
This map shows the boundaries of the Downtown Living Initiative Program, which occupies the 
entire downtown area. Parcels in red denote some of the planned residential projects that are part of 
the program.  
 
Implementation and Impact 
When seeking to implement DLIP, the City of Houston and HDMD paid 
particular attention to the total value of the tax abatement that would be offered. To 
calculate a basis for the incentive, they looked at market conditions for constructing 
multifamily units inside and outside of downtown (Houston Downtown 
Management District, 2012).  The analysis, a summary of which is shown in Figure 2, 
included differences in land cost, construction cost, and achievable rents. The 
calculated cost differential between downtown and non-downtown units was then 
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noted as the gap that needed to be filled to make residential projects downtown 
financially feasible. While this is an overall estimate of conditions inside and outside 
of downtown Houston, sites in both areas are likely to deviate somewhat from this 
average based on specific location, surrounding amenities, and other factors that 
impact land values and rents.  
Figure 2: Housing Development Cost Differential Between Downtown and 
Non-Downtown Residential Development 
  
Source: Houston Downtown Management District 
One change made to the program shortly after it started was an adjustment 
to boundaries. Initially, the borders for eligible projects were more narrowly 
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focused on the eastern half of downtown (which, as mentioned above, is less 
developed than the western half of downtown). However, shortly after 
implementation of the program, the borders were expanded to include all of what is 
traditionally considered downtown (Interview, January 23rd, 2015). 
Figure 3: New Residential Projects in Downtown Houston Part of DLIP 
 
Source: Houston Business Journal 
When DLIP began in 2012, the program was structured to allow for 2,500 
units to take part in the program. However, developer demand was much higher 
than initially anticipated and all 2,500 units were allocated out to developers within 
about one year of the launch. As a result of the high demand, a provision to allow 
abatement on another 2,500 units was passed, bringing the total number of units 
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within the scope of the program to 5,000 (DLIP Update, 2014). By December 2014, 
the remaining 2,500 units had been allocated. 
A total of 19 projects have been approved under the tax abatement, but only 
one has been built and begun occupying as of early 2015 (Interview, January 23rd, 
2015).  This makes it difficult to measure the success of the program related to 
initial goals surrounding vibrancy and commercial activity, which are likely to pick 
up more once more projects have been completed. However, the impending 
addition of 5,000 residential units to the downtown landscape can be seen as a 
success in and of itself when compared to the number of new residential buildings 
built prior to the adoption of the program. Only one notable market rate project, 
One Park Place (340 units, completed in 2009), was constructed in the 2000’s. 
Strong economic growth and large population increases in Houston in the wake of 
the great recession likely aided the briskness with which unit abatements were 
allocated, but Andy Icken, the Chief Economic Development Officer for the City of 
Houston, sees DLIP as a “but for” program, meaning that projects would likely not be 
possible but for the incentive in place (Houston Chonicle, 2015). 
The strong demand exhibited by developers in claiming all 5,000 units 
signaled to the program creators that the incentive was enough to significantly alter 
the financial prospects for downtown residential projects. With the cap on all 
available units reached, the program is now closed to new applicants. An 
interviewee who worked closely on the DLIP noted, “We need to get these units on 
the market and prove that there is demand. Once they are built and people see that 
there is demand, then I think we’ll be ok or we’ll look at it [to reassess]. But right 
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now we are happy with the 5,000 that we have gotten over the past two years.” 
(Interview, January 23rd, 2015). 
Analysis of Policy 
Although a program centered on tax subsidies as an incentive to promote 
growth involves a significant cost to city coffers, structuring the subsidy as an 
abatement on incremental property value offers many features that make the idea 
the most attractive means to funding through tax subsidy.  First, abatements are 
low-risk from the perspective of a city. No incentive is being provided up front with 
risk of being lost if the project does not happen. Related to this, abatements are also 
more politically palatable to taxpayers. No money is siphoned from other programs 
in order to fund the program. Since the reimbursement is based on incremental 
value of a property after project completion, all money allocated through the 
program is money that would not be generated unless the new building was in 
place. In this way, the program essentially funds itself, and only after the projects 
are built. This is particularly important for a program like DLIP, as affordable 
housing and other housing initiatives are generally seen as a higher priority and 
more deserving of existing city funds. 
An important part of the minimal resistance to the program from citizens is 
that it was generally accepted that downtown residential development would not 
occur without implementation of DLIP. Had this not been the case or had it not been 
demonstrated clearly, accusations of unnecessary abatements or misuse of tax 
dollars could have derailed the program. It was also critical to make clear to citizens 
the benefits that residential space would provide related to vibrancy and increased 
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commercial activity. Lack of demonstrating this could have similarly made passage 
of the program more difficult through increased resistance. Because there was buy-
in on both of these fronts, this was not the case.  
In contrast to the Washington, DC case that will be examined later in this 
paper, relatively little pushback was received from business interests when the 
proposal for DLIP was brought before the city. Because the primary cost of the 
program was born on the city (through future taxable income) and there was no 
requirement to be part of the program, there was little reason for developers, 
property owners, or other business interests to oppose DLIP. If anything, the ability 
to receive abatements that promote increased development would lead them to 
support implementation of the program.  
 
Distributed over time 
In the case of DLIP, $75 million in tax breaks will be provided to project 
owners assuming that the maximum allowance of $15,000 is given to all 5,000 units 
in the program. However, that cost will be distributed over at least 15 years (and 
almost certainly longer since the new projects are not all being completed at once). 
So while the cost in lost income to the City of Houston is significant, it is made more 
manageable by being spread over a longer period of time. As a point of reference, 
the total City of Houston budget for 2015 is $4.8 billion (City of Houston, 2015). If 
the DLIP program cost the city $5 million per year ($75 million spread over a 
minimum of 15 years), it would cost just 0.1% of the total city budget. 
The drawback of this payment method to developers is that they must wait 
up to 15 years to receive their abatement, hurting the present value of the incentive. 
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Take for example a new 200-unit building that is part of the DLIP. It is eligible for up 
to $3 million in property tax abatements upon completion. If that is distributed 
evenly over 15 years and a discount rate of 8% is assumed, the net present value of 
the incentive is only $1.71 million, about 57% of the nominal value.  That difference 
is built into the financial model of a developer when they analyze the profitability of 
a project. 
Washington DC – A Living Downtown 
In many ways, Washington, DC can be viewed as a success story in promoting 
downtown residential space. In contrast to Houston, which is still in the early stages 
of the program it initiated, Washington has had a policy in place to encourage 
residential development downtown since the early 1990’s.  Though, residential 
development there did not truly begin in earnest until the late nineties and early 
2000’s. Since then, the population has increased dramatically. In 1996, there were 
approximately 1,300 housing units downtown. By 2007, that number had increased 
to 6,300 and it continues to grow today (McCarthy, 2013). Current estimates of 
downtown housing stand at over 12,000 units (Downtown Development Working 
District, 2008). Walking around downtown Washington, the change is evident. 
Streets in many parts of downtown, particularly the Penn Quarter and Chinatown 
neighborhoods, are active at all times of day and commercial activity is vibrant. It is 
no coincidence that these areas of downtown are also closest to concentrations of 
residential space that have been built. The following sections will describe in further 
detail the policy Washington, DC has used to build up the residential population 
downtown. 
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Overview of Policy 
Washington, DC uses a program based on zoning and regulatory rules that 
require the construction residential space in certain parts of the city. Within the 
zoning code of the city, there is a housing priority area overlay zone (Municipal 
Regulations, 2000). As seen in Figure 4, it occupies a portion of the eastern end of 
downtown and extends north of Massachusetts Avenue into the Mt. Vernon 
neighborhood, immediately adjacent to what is traditionally considered downtown. 
Within the overlay, any new construction is required to allocate 4.5 FAR to 
residential space. With the height limits in place, this equals just more than half of 
the 8.0 FAR that is buildable under standard zoning in the area, If residential space 
is built on the site, total FAR allowed is increased from 8.0 to 10.0.  
Figure 4: Area of Housing Priority Area Zoning Overlay 
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The intention of requiring 4.5 FAR of each property to be residential is not designed 
to create new buildings that have four and a half floors of housing units with the 
remainder of the building occupied as office space. Very few buildings are designed 
to mix residential and office uses. Rather, structuring the policy in this way places an 
equal burden on property owners in the area to include residential space in their 
developments (Interview, February 9th, 2015). In order to distribute the housing 
requirement to specific properties, the city developed a “combined lot” provision. 
The provision allows for two or more properties in the overlay area to be treated as 
one, allowing the “preferred use” requirements for residential of both properties to 
be built on one site (Municipal Regulations, 2000). As an example, two property 
owners could agree to treat their parcels as a combined lot (regardless of whether 
they are physically connected to one another), with one property owner building 
the residential space required for both parcels on their property while the other 
property owner builds office space. Typically, this type of agreement between two 
developers involves some cash payment to the owner building residential space to 
account for the fact that it is less profitable (Interview, January 22nd, 2015). Without 
that payment, they would have no incentive to agree to take on the additional 
residential component. 
As an incentive to make residential development financially more attractive, 
the city instituted a form of bonus densities for residential space built anywhere 
downtown (within or outside of the housing overlay). However, since Washington, 
DC has height limits, the densities are given in the form of transfer development 
rights (TDR’s).  Every square foot of residential space built is eligible to receive 
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TDR’s. Those TDR’s can then be used to increase density above what is regularly 
permitted in designated off-site “receiving areas” of the city outside of downtown 
(Fruehling, 2007). Residential space built south of Massachusetts Avenue receives 
TDR’s at a 2 to 1 ratio and residential space built north of Massachusetts Avenue 
receives TDR’s at a 1 to 1 ratio. As an example, a developer building a 100,000 
square foot residential building downtown also receives 200,000 square feet of 
TDR’s that can be applied to new development in the receiving zones, making 
projects there more profitable given increased density. The developer can either use 
them to increase the density of a project they are developing or can sell them to 
other developers. Still, whether they are used or sold, the TDR’s, in conjunction with 
payments received through the combined lot policy, allow for financial gains that 
help offset the fact that residential space by itself is not as profitable as office space.  
The buying and selling of transfer development rights has created a market 
for TDR’s (Interview, February 9th, 2015). Because transactions are private, the 
price of credits at any given time are not tracked and the going rate is not public 
knowledge. An interviewee I spoke with estimates that current credits fluctuate 
between $7-$13 per square foot depending on market conditions and demand. 
In addition to the housing overlay, the city government has one other means 
to promote the development of residential space by the private sector downtown. A 
key stakeholder in the process noted that at times, the city structures deals 
involving the sale of city-owned land under the condition that it be developed with 
uses desired by the city, such as residential space or a particular commercial use (i.e. 
a grocery store to improve food access in a neighborhood) (Interview, January 22nd, 
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2015). In doing so, it potentially loses some of the market value of the land by not 
simply selling to the highest value use. These types of transactions are one-off deals 
though and obviously dependent on city ownership of land.  
Implementation and Impact 
 In the early 1980’s Marion Barry, who was mayor of DC at the time, 
assembled the Mayor’s Downtown Committee to strategize about the future 
development of downtown (Interview, February 23rd, 2015). Given development 
that was occurring at the time in the West End neighborhood of the city, it seemed 
likely that development would eventually push eastward toward the traditional 
downtown area. According to an interviewee with knowledge of the process, the 
thinking in creating the committee was to strategize ahead of development: “We 
knew it would be redeveloped. The question is whether it would be revitalized?” 
The resulting product of the committee was a downtown plan: A Living Downtown 
for Washington, DC. As the name suggests, the plan created a shared vision for the 
city that emphasized a mix of uses, particularly the need for housing, retail, and arts 
& entertainment space in addition to the concentration of office space.  
 While the plan of the Mayors Downtown Committee laid the groundwork for 
a vibrant city and recognized the benefits of diversifying the use of downtown space, 
it carried with it no means to make the vision a reality. The initial use of a regulatory 
framework to promote or enforce these recommendations began with the 
implementation of a 1.5 FAR requirement for retail in a zoning overlay created to 
promote the preservation and expansion of the downtown retail district. If a 
building in the overlay did not have at least 1.5 FAR of commercial space, it could 
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purchase the FAR equivalent from property owners with excess retail space. 
Because this regulation required space to be allocated to uses that were not 
necessarily the highest and best use from a profitability standpoint, it was met with 
pushback from developers and property owners.  
 Shortly thereafter, the focus shifted to housing. The Greater Washington 
Board of Trade, a network of business professionals and non-profit leaders, put 
together a Housing Task Force with both public and private sector participants to 
strategize a means to implement the housing portion of the Living Downtown plan 
(Interview, February 19th, 2015). The task force concluded that there was no 
demand for residential space downtown and that providing incentive through 
subsidy (such as a tax incentive or abatement) would cost far too much to merit its 
use. Hypothetical pro formas projected extremely low rents and high construction 
costs.  
 With subsidies out of the question, attention turned to a zoning solution 
similar to that used in the shopping district. However, the private sector was still 
strongly opposed to the idea of a zoning regulation out of fear that it would decrease 
property values and development potential of the affected area. The possibility of 
housing regulation was their biggest concern and the discussion dragged out for 
years. After numerous proposals from both sides that failed to generate a solution, 
the Office of Planning was able to bring the issue to a vote by the Zoning 
Commission, which sided with the city. As a means to compromise with the 
development community and attempt to address their concerns, the city increased 
density slightly in parts of the overlay and initiated the combined lot and TDR 
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policy. All of these actions helped improve profitability of the construction of 
residential space and compensate for the zoning burden.  
 Due to the recession of the early 90’s, which hit the real estate market 
particularly hard, little construction took place. In the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, 
the city did provide a small tax abatement  to two projects in order to help them 
move forward and demonstrate that demand did exist for downtown housing. As 
developers came to see that people did want to live downtown and the achievable 
rents were higher than initially anticipated, construction of residential space 
increased dramatically and the zoning policy became less controversial.  
  A critical factor in the success of Washington’s zoning policy has been the 
District’s ability to recognize and allow for adjustments as needed that are better 
able to lead to the desired outcomes of the policy. For example, until 2001 there was 
a requirement that the residential portion of a combined lot deal be built prior to 
the completion of the associated office space (Interview, January 22nd, 2015). The 
rule was meant to ensure that developers agreeing to construct residential units 
would actually do so. However, this gummed up the development process by making 
the office market dependent on the residential market. The city realized the 
impediment to development that the rule caused and relaxed and modified the 
policy to work with developers to reduce barriers to new projects getting started. 
Even today, the city is looking at how aspects of the policy may be better suited 
under current market conditions. Discussions are underway currently for possible 
revisions to the zoning overlay and TDR policy that would broaden the area where 
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housing is encouraged to other parts of downtown as well as to nearby emerging 
neighborhoods like NoMa and Navy Yard.  
The initial goal of Washington, DC outlined for the Downtown Development 
District was to have 12,410 housing units downtown, almost 9,000 more than the 
3,707 that existed before the year 2000. As of 2009, 5,180 new units had been built 
and 3,382 were under development, essentially reaching that goal (Downtown 
Development District Working Group, 2008). However, the city continues to 
promote the addition of new residential space with a desire to continue increasing 
the population downtown and in downtown adjacent neighborhoods.  
Analysis of Policy 
Looking at the use of regulatory zoning policies as a residential strategy and the 
experience of Washington, DC offers important insights into the implementation and 
use of such a framework. Specifically, there are four areas worthy of discussion: 
municipal cost, resistance of the private sector, concentration of housing, and 
administrative upkeep. 
Municipal Cost  
Unlike a tax abatement or other system based on tax subsidy, regulatory 
zoning polices like those employed in Washington, DC impose no direct cost to a 
city. Costs are born on the market through reduced land value due to the 
requirement of a potentially less profitable use. In the case of Washington, the city 
attempted to make up for the reduction in value through the allowance of increased 
density on sites, issuance of transfer development rights, and the ability of 
developers to receive payment from other developers for taking on the residential 
portion of a combined lot agreement. Again, these added rights for developers posed 
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no direct cost to the city. Instead, they allowed developers to create value via means 
that did not previously exist.  
Because there is no cost burden to the city, the issue is less contentious for 
citizens.  The program does not compete for funding with any other program and 
essentially functions outside of any budgeting issue. As a result, it is much more 
politically palatable to taxpayers. However, because the cost is alternatively placed 
on the market, it faces pushback from the development community.  
Resistance from Developers 
 As seen in the implementation of A Living Guide to Washington D.C., 
resistance from the private sector to regulation is not surprising when it has the 
potential to affect their investments. The largest hurdle to getting Washington’s 
policy off the ground was the push back from developers in the city, who were very 
resistant to change. Although it slowed the process and they often found themselves 
at odds, the city made a point of including the private sector in the process from the 
start. The Mayors Downtown Task Force that created A Living Guide to Washington, 
D.C. included both public and private sector representation. All sides agreed that 
diversifying uses of downtown buildings stood to benefit the city, but they disagreed 
on the means to do it. Committees formed after that to study implementation also 
involved participants from the private sector.  
Ideally, the benefits from bonus densities would equal the costs of the zoning 
policy. However, it is hard to pinpoint exactly what that difference is and it is likely 
to differ slightly from site to site. Any new rules with relation to zoning will require 
some market readjustment, but should recalibrate in time. In the case of 
38 
 
Washington, the perceived lack of demand for any residential space downtown 
during the planning stages did not help to ease the fears of developers.  
Concentration of Housing   
An important component of a zoning approach is the size and location of the 
area on which restrictions will be placed. The housing overlay within the Downtown 
Development Overlay District of Washington, DC targeted specific neighborhoods on 
the eastern end of downtown (Penn Quarter, Chinatown, Mt. Vernon Square) for 
residential space. In some ways, it makes sense to begin a program with a specific 
target area in mind. Concentrating the program in one particular area that can 
create a base of residential activity can be a helpful starting point to promote other 
activity such as neighborhood serving retail. On the other hand, it leaves other 
portions of downtown without a desired vibrant mix of uses. Figure 5 shows the 
stark contrast in housing concentration in different neighborhoods. Large swathes 
of both existing and under development housing can be seen in Mt. Vernon, Gallery 
Place (Chinatown), and Market Square (Penn Quarter) while Franklin Square, the 
Retail Core (Metro Center), and Pennsylvania Avenue West have very little 
residential development. Some of the proposed changes to the housing overlay that 
are under review now would help to address this by promoting the construction of 
housing outside of the overlay zone. As the housing overlay policy and downtown 
itself mature, this appears to be the next logical step in the evolution toward the 
city’s vision of A Living Downtown. 
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Figure 5: Existing and Planned Residential Space, Downtown Washington -2009 
 
Source: Downtown Development District Working Group, 2009 
 
Administrative Upkeep  
An interviewee noted the significant administrative upkeep necessary to track 
properties acting on different portions of the regulation, particularly combined lot  
rules. The agreements between properties often involved webs of multiple 
properties taking part in the agreements to allocate their housing requirements 
(Interview, February 9th, 2015). Those properties were then linked to one another 
through the policy and required documentation and tracking to ensure that each 
had met its requirement. The interviewee noted that, “the management and 
enforcement of it is really complex… It all has to be accounted for and the 
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accounting for that is just very hard.” As a result, the Office of Planning is seeking to 
simplify the combined lot linkages to other properties as part of the policy 
adjustments currently being considered.  
Hypothetical Project Analysis – Washington D.C. Property 
The high geographic variation of real estate market dynamics poses 
challenges to the assessment of any one downtown housing policy on its surface. 
Every region varies in its existing built form, legal parameters, and general cultural 
attitudes. On top of that, the structure and relative strength of the local economy 
varies from region to region and also changes over time. All of these factors affect 
the demand for space, the manner in which new space is constructed, and the price 
which people are willing to pay for it. Some markets may be strong while others are 
weak. Others may see demand for one product type, but not another.   
As a result, the use of a case study that applies potential policies in the same 
place is helpful in analyzing policies on an even playing field. This report will look at 
a hypothetical parcel of land to be developed in downtown Washington, DC. It 
begins with a baseline scenario under normal market conditions and will then apply 
a tax-based policy and a zoning-based policy to examine the financial effect on each 
with regard the developer, the city, and to overall project viability.  It assumes all 
other factors related to the external environment equal in order to isolate the 
impact to downtown residential policies. Since the findings of the comparison will 
vary from location to location based on market conditions, results will not be 
transferrable outside of Washington, DC. However, the concepts and practices used 
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to apply these policies could be applied elsewhere to determine the effect of policies 
on market conditions in any given location.  
 
Scenario  
The case study explores the hypothetical option to build an office building or 
an apartment building on a parcel of land. Under strictly market conditions, office 
space is the likely choice to build by a developer, as it can garner higher rents and 
therefore allow the developer to offer more for the land. However, application of the 
housing policies discussed previously can help to shift market behavior in such a 
way that encourages the creation of residential space. Obviously, office and 
residential space are not the only two potential land uses for a site, but narrowing 
the focus will help simplify the study while still conveying the market impact of 
residential policies.  
The financial analysis presented here seeks to determine the amount a 
developer would be willing to pay for land in order to reach their target return on 
investment. This is common practice in assessing real estate development projects. 
All other variables in the financial model are known or can be accounted for in some 
way. Attainable rents are dictated by what the market is willing to pay and can be 
estimated to project total income a property will generate. Since a developer knows 
the target returns they are looking to make, they can use the total income of the 
project and apply the target return to determine how much can be spent on land 
acquisition and construction and still meet their return. Construction costs, like 
rents, are dictated by the market and are out of the control of a developer. By 
subtracting the estimated construction costs from the available funds, land 
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acquisition cost is left as the residual value. In this way, we are backing into land 
value by determining the residual value left over from project income after 
accounting for all other project costs. The formula below offers a simplified 
explanation (without taking into account time) of how land value can be calculated 
with all other variables known. 
 
Return on Investment = Project Income / (Construction Cost + Land Cost) 
   Therefore… 
Land Value = (Project Income /Return on Investment) – Construction Cost  
 
Determining the amount a potential developer would be willing to pay for land is 
appropriate in this study since the party willing to pay the most for land is the one 
that will gain control of that land. They will then build whatever maximizes value of 
the land in order to justify the cost paid. 
 Under both scenarios, total building area is assumed to be 150,000 square 
feet (SF). Given height limits in Washington, space is distributed across 10 floors of 
15,000 square feet each. The rentable space of the apartment building is assumed to 
85% while rentable space of the office building is slightly higher at 95% since 
common area space is included in office rents. The first floor of both buildings is set 
aside as a retail space that can garner $55/SF rents (triple net). 
Assumptions 
The Washington metro area ranks second in the U.S. in total office space and 
rents in downtown DC rival the strongest office markets in the country (CBRE, 
2013). While downtown apartments can garner fairly significant rents relative to 
most other regions, they cannot match office rents.  As of the end of 2014, the 
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average office rent in the Washington, DC CBD for Class A space was $56.40 per 
square foot per year (gross) (Colliers, 2014). Average apartment rents, which are 
typically calculated on a monthly basis, were $3.21/sf/month for the same area at 
that time (Delta Associates, 2014, 1). Annualized to put this in perspective with 
office space, residential space leased for an average of $38.52/sf. The rents modeled 
for both sectors in this study are given a premium above that rent to account for the 
fact that they will be newer product that is presumably built to the top of the 
market.  Office rents are projected to price at $62.04/sf (gross), a 10% premium 
over the submarket average. Apartments are projected to price at $46.00/SF, or 
$3.83/SF on a monthly basis, a slightly higher premium than the office market given 
trends in apartment pricing and performance of recent properties built downtown 
Washington. Figure 6 shows key assumptions made in this case study. A full analysis 
that shows all assumptions is included as an appendix to this report.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
Figure 6: Financial Analysis Base Scenario and Assumptions 
 
Costs 
Construction costs are based on data from Delta Associates’ Market Maker 
Survey for year-end 2014. The report surveys those active in the real estate market 
in Washington and collects data on development costs, investment returns, cap rate 
trends, and business outlook. Total construction costs for new CBD office space are 
estimated to be $420/sf while total costs for new high-rise residential space are 
estimated to be $368/sf. 
45 
 
Property taxes in the District of Columbia vary depending on the type of 
property being assessed. Residential spaces are taxed at a rate of $0.85 per $100 of 
assessed property value (Office of Tax and Revenue, 2015). Office space is taxed at a 
rate of $1.85 per $100 of value for any value over $3 million. The first $3 million in 
value of any commercial property is taxed 20 cents lower at $1.65 per $100 of 
assessed value. An additional Business Improvement District (BID) assessment of 
$0.15 per square foot of space is applied to all office space. The BID assessment is 
not placed on residential properties.  
 
Return on Investment and Sale  
 The model assumes a target annual rate of return of 12% over the course of 
the project. The building will be owned for six years after completion at which point 
it will be sold. A 3% cost of sale is assumed at disposition to account for selling fees. 
The cap rate at time of sale is estimated to be 5.5% for the office building and 5.0% 
for the apartment building. These are based on recent data on cap rates in the area 
and account for the fact that multifamily product is trading at a lower cap rate than 
other product types.  
Base Case 
 With all of this data, we can determine the value of land for development 
under both scenarios. Figure 7 provides an overview of land value for office space as 
well as residential space. A full financial analysis is available as an appendix to this 
paper.  
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Figure 7: Land Value of Hypothetical Development as Office or Apartment 
Space 
 
If built out as office space, the hypothetical parcel or land is valued at $24.2 million. 
As residential apartments, it is worth approximately $20.1 million. Therefore, the 
financial gap to make residential space as attractive as office space on a typical lot of 
this size in downtown Washington, DC is approximately $4.1 million. Under these 
conditions, a developer seeking to build office space would always be able to outbid 
a developer seeking to build residential space. The policies in place in Houston, 
Washington, DC, and numerous other cities throughout the country seek to address 
this difference in value by putting in place mechanisms that help close the gap.  
Applying a Tax-Based Policy 
 The benefit of using a tax abatement structure to encourage residential space 
is that the incentive is paid for using money generated from the project itself.  While 
this makes it politically attractive, it also means that the incentives are distributed in 
the years after the project has been built. To understand the value of those 
abatements to a developer today, it is necessary to determine the their net present 
value (NPV). The NPV can then be viewed as the amount a developer would be 
willing to pay above the residential market value of land and still hit return targets. 
In order to show the effect of a tax abatement policy, a system structured like 
that of Houston is employed. Like in Houston, each unit is allotted up to $15,000 that 
is collected from 75% of the incremental property tax value after the project’s 
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completion. The table below shows the estimated value of the abatement each year 
as well as the NPV of the total abatement.  
Figure 8: Tax Abatement of $15,000 Per Unit 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Present Value of Tax Abatement of $15,000 Per Unit 
 
Given the 170 units planned in the project, the total eligible tax abatement is 
$2,550,000. It reaches that cap in the sixth year after completion. Applying a 
discount rate of 7.6%1*, the net present value of those payments is equal to $2.01 
million. So theoretically, the availability of the abatement should make a developer 
willing to pay an additional $2 million on top of the initial valuation to build 
residential space and still reach the target return of 12%. However, this would bring 
the total price of the land to $22.1 million, still not as valuable as the land if used for 
office space. As a result, this incentive would do little to change market behavior.  
How large of an incentive would it take to bring residential land value in line with 
office value? 
                                                             
* The discount rate assumed is based on the approximate weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for 
the development project. WACC is the cost of capital to a developer, which averages the cost of debt 
and equity involved in a project and can be viewed as the total cost of funds to a developer.  
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An abatement to meet the financial gap would require a present value equal 
to the $4.1 million gap in value between office and residential space. Figures 10 and 
11 model this scenario. Using 75% of property taxes, it would take 14 years of 
abatements to reach the $4.1 million in present day value to make residential space 
feasible (again assuming an 7.66% discount rate). The total amount paid in nominal 
terms over the course of the incentive would be more than $7.0 million, or about 
$41,000 per unit.  
Figure 10:Tax Abatement Necessary to Meet Financial Gap Between Office and 
Residential Space 
 
Figure 11: Present Value of Tax Abatement Necessary to Meet Financial Gap 
Between Office and Residential Space 
 
The higher the necessary price per unit, the less likely a policy under this structure 
would be feasible. Despite the fact that the abatement is generated by income to the 
project, policymakers would likely draw the line at some point as being too costly 
for the benefit it would provide.  A price of $41,000 per unit could potentially pose 
challenges in implementing this as a singular policy response.  
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Evaluating the overall costs to various parties in this scenario, there are no 
additional costs imposed upon the private sector. The present value of the cost to 
the public sector is $4.1 million, but the nominal value of that money over the 14 
years it is distributed is $7.0 million. 
Applying a Zoning-Based Policy 
 The results of the tax-based policy can be compared to the use of a zoning-
based policy and the incentives tied to it through bonus densities and other means. 
The structure of the policy examined here is designed to match the existing policy in 
Washington, DC. The primary financial incentive to a developer looking to build 
residential space comes from the use or sale of transfer development rights and 
payments from other developers in combined lot deals that relieve them of their 
housing requirement.  
TDR’s serve as a proxy for density bonus in Washington, DC’s policy due to 
the height limit there, but are useful in this analysis because of their simplicity in 
pricing out the value of additional density. The price of TDR’s fluctuates as market 
demand and their supply fluctuate. The going rate of TDR’s at any given time is not 
public knowledge. However, an interviewee estimated that the average price tended 
to move between $7-$13/sf with an average rate of about $10/sf. This analysis will 
use the average price to account for the benefits provided to the developer by TDR 
policy. 
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Figure 12: Summary of Zoning-Based Policy With TDR’s – Washington, DC 
Model 
 
 Policy currently dictates that housing built south of Massachusetts Avenue, 
the area traditionally considered to be downtown, generates TDR’s at a two to one 
ratio. The construction of a 150,000 square foot residential building would create 
300,000 square feet worth of TDR’s. If those sell to another developer for $10/sf, 
that would generate an additional $3 million worth of project value.  
Applying the same logic used in the tax-base policy analysis, that $3 million 
can be added to the residential value of land. This brings the total amount a 
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residential developer is willing to pay to $23.1 million. Again, this does not match 
the value of the land as office space, leaving a $1.1 million gap.  
The remainder of the gap must be filled by developers through the combined 
lot policy to make up the difference. Since some residential space is required in all 
new space in the housing overlay, developers not building residential space will 
need to pay those that are in order to relieve them of their requirement. As an 
example, a developer building a fully residential building will build more housing 
than the required 4.5 FAR. Any additional residential space can be counted toward 
the residential requirement in a non-residential building. Non-residential 
developers meet their 4.5 FAR requirement by purchasing the excess residential 
FAR from other properties to be counted toward their requirement. The two enter 
into a combined lot agreement and the non-residential developer pays the 
residential developer to build his residential. 
In the case of the building under review, half of the residential space can be 
allocated to another property through combined lot policy. As a result, a developer 
building office space should theoretically be willing to pay for half of the remaining 
financing gap in order to put that residential space toward their own housing 
requirement. This mechanism helps bring the market for residential space and 
office space to a new equilibrium with one another that makes residential 
development feasible. However, in doing so, it also reduces the total value of land by 
the amount of the combined lot payment. Because the office developer paid 
$550,000 to be relieved of their housing requirement, they must pay $550,000 less 
for their land to still be able to reach their 12% return target. Therefore, the office 
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developer would only be willing to pay $23.65 million (instead of $24.2 million) for 
an identical piece of land. With the $550,000 payment from another office developer 
and $3 million from the sale of TDR’s, the apartment developer can now also pay 
$23.65 million for the land and be competitive. Because the zoning regulations to 
meet housing requirements must be fulfilled by all builders, the market will always 
meet a gap that exists after other incentives are taken into account and the 
maximum value of the land will decrease accordingly. Interestingly, if TDR’s reached 
a value of $13.67 per square foot, that incentive would fully make up for the $4.1 
million financing gap with this project and no combined lot payments would be 
necessary.  
Evaluating costs in this scenario, no direct costs are born on the public 
sector. The sale of TDR’s, which creates a new market providing benefits to the 
purchaser, provides $3 million in value. The cost to the private sector is $550,000 
due to the combined lot payment. As a result, the market bears a $550,000 loss in 
value to the property. While there is no direct affect to the public sector, there are 
potential indirect implications with the loss of market value, as a lower value would 
lead to smaller property tax revenues.  However, many other variables affecting 
land value make this difficult to assess and price out in the long term. For example, 
as noted in the first section of this report, mixed-use vibrant spaces create higher 
land values than single use areas on average. Under this assumption, requiring 
residential use would hurt land value in the short term but help it in the long run. 
Because of their variability, these costs are not modeled in this analysis. 
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Conclusion 
Financial modeling of a hypothetical development helps to clarify the way in 
which the policy approaches used by Washington and Houston to increase 
residential space downtown distribute costs and impact various stakeholders. 
Though both work to alter the market dynamic in such a way that makes the 
construction of residential space more competitive, they do so in very different 
ways. The tax abatement policy used by the City of Houston places the primary 
financial burden on the city to provide funds to property developers while the 
zoning policy used in Washington, DC relies more heavily on value created by bonus 
densities and private sector costs. While both have been successful in their 
respective location, local market dynamics played a large role in the ability of these 
policies to be effective. There is no one size fits all policy to incentivize residential 
development downtown. However, there are factors to consider in determining 
what policies suit a particular place best. Awareness of policy options available and 
understanding their implications can better position a city to achieve a goal of 
creating more residential space downtown and increasing vibrancy.  Based on the 
findings of this report, market conditions for residential space, municipal finances, 
and the local political situation are particularly important in determining the most 
apt policy for a city looking to promote downtown residential space.  
Market Conditions 
Perhaps most important in determining the policy that is best for a city is 
having a firm understanding of, and being able to work with, the current market 
conditions in an area. Before implementing a program, officials in Houston were 
confident that a demand for downtown housing existed based on the low vacancy 
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rates of existing units and feedback from residents. The one missing piece was a gap 
in financing that could allow initial projects to get built and establish a residential 
base. That base could then hopefully be used as a foundation to catalyze further 
development. Because of those conditions, use of tax abatement made sense. In 
cities that need just a small boost to put them over the tipping point of feasible 
development, tax abatements are a quick and relatively effective way to provide that 
boost and get development going on projects. 
On the contrary, conditions like those in Washington, DC in the 1980’s were not 
well suited for the use of tax abatement. At the time, market perception was that no 
demand existed at all for downtown housing. Regardless of any reasonable 
abatement offered, developers would have little interest in constructing new 
residential space. Zoning was the only tool that could force developers to build 
residential if they wanted to be able to build other uses as well (of course, this then 
also hinges on demand existing for office space or other uses). However, as is the 
hope in Houston, once a residential base was built and proved demand, it helped 
ease developer fears about building residential space. Though small abatements 
have been used from time to time in Washington to get some projects off the 
ground, zoning policy and the TDR incentives were the key instruments in creating 
the vibrant areas that exist in parts of downtown today.  
Political Climate 
Despite its effectiveness over time in building up residential space 
downtown, the housing overlay requirement in Washington faced fierce resistance 
from the private sector and took years from the time it was initially conceived until 
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it was actually implemented. The strength of a local government and its ability to 
implement policy plays a role in even being able to implement a policy like this in 
the first place. Municipalities with existing political contentiousness or weak 
structure systems may face difficulty using this strategy. Bonus densities and other 
tools to create value can help ease private sector concerns, but they are unlikely to 
eliminate all fear related to altering the status quo.  
Relative to Washington, Houston saw very little push back against its policy 
and was able to implement it not long after it was introduced. Much of this had to do 
with the means of funding the policy. Private sector interests were pleased since 
funding benefited them and citizens were in support on the whole because the tax 
dollars provided from the program would be generated by the developments 
themselves. 
Public Finances 
In the case of Houston, funds for DLIP were not taken from other programs 
and the total cost of the program made up a very small percentage of total budget 
for the city. Still, though this made the policy attractive to developers and citizens, it 
left the city responsible for the cost burden. In cash strapped municipalities, 
abatement policies that require large amounts of government funding are likely to 
face more resistance. In these situations, mechanisms to create value like bonus 
densities would likely be more politically palatable. Similarly, if government funds 
for a downtown living program were being diverted from other housing programs 
like affordable housing, there would also likely be more resistance. If minimizing 
cost to the government is a primary concern, zoning-based policy with bonus 
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densities would likely be a more attractive option, as it would not cost the 
government any direct funds.  
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Appendix A: Overview of Base Scenario for Downtown Land 
Development 
 
Overview of Base Scenario for Downtown Land Development Appendix A
Office Multifamily Apt.
Building Size 150,000 150,000
Rentable Space Efficiency 95% 85%
Total Rentable Space 142,500 127,500
Operating Vacancy 10% 5%
Gross Rent/SF ($) $62.04 $44.00
Operating Expenses ($/SF) $15.00 $9.92
Property Taxes (per $100 value) $1.85* $0.85
BID Assessment ($/SF) $0.15 -**
Hard Costs ($/SF) $311 $292
Soft Costs ($/SF) $109 $76
Annual Rent Escalation 3% 3%
Cap Rate (going out) 5.50% 5%
Year of Sale 6 6
Cost of Sale 3% 3%
Target IRR 12.00% 12.00%
Equity Multiple 2.0x 2.0x
Property Value $24,200,000 $20,100,000
Difference in Value
** Residential space is not currently subject to BID assessment.
Note: Tenant improvements and upfitting of space are assumed to be included in construction costs
$4,100,000
Building Use
Note: Data on hards costs and softs cost comes from Delta Associates 2014 market maker survey. Tax data comes from DC 
Government. Other information is based on estimates of current market conditions
* Tax rate on office space is $1.85 per $100 in value for all value above $3 million. The first $3 million in value is taxed at 
$1.65 per $100 in value.
Base Scenario: Hypothetical Development Comparison
 DOWNTOWN WASHINGTON, DC SITE
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Applied Policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Applied Policies Appendix B - 1
Units 170
Abatement Per Unit $15,000
Total Eligible Abatement $2,550,000
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
Annual Property Tax $585,483 $597,193 $609,136 $621,319 $633,746 $646,420
Abatement $439,112 $447,894 $456,852 $465,989 $475,309 $264,842
Cumulative Sum of Abatement $439,112 $887,007 $1,343,859 $1,809,848 $2,285,158 $2,550,000
Present Value of Abatement $2,005,981
Applied Policy
Tax Abatement: Current Houston Policy 
Applied Policies Appendix B - 2
Units 170
Abatement Per Unit $41,261
Total Eligible Abatement $7,014,351
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7
Annual Property Tax $585,483 $597,193 $609,136 $621,319 $633,746 $646,420 $659,349
Abatement $439,112 $447,894 $456,852 $465,989 $475,309 $484,815 $494,512
Cumulative Sum of Abatement $439,112 $887,007 $1,343,859 $1,809,848 $2,285,158 $2,769,973 $3,264,485
Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 Year 12 Year 13 Year 14
Annual Property Tax $672,536 $685,987 $699,706 $713,700 $727,974 $742,534 $757,385
Abatement $504,402 $514,490 $524,780 $535,275 $545,981 $556,900 $568,038
Cumulative Sum of Abatement $3,768,886 $4,283,376 $4,808,156 $5,343,431 $5,889,412 $6,446,313 $7,014,351
Present Value of Abatement $4,115,661
Tax Abatement Necessary to Meet Financial Gap Between Office and Residential Space
Applied Policy
Applied Policies Appendix B - 3
Base Case Office Land Value $24,200,000
- Base Case Apartment Land Value $20,100,000
Financing Gap $4,100,000
Transfer Development Rights
Total Size of Building 150,000             
x TDR Ratio 2.0
Total TDR's 300,000             
x TDR Sale Value $10
Total Value Created by TDR's $3,000,000
Combined Lot Policy Payment
Financing Gap $4,100,000
- Total Value Created by TDR's $3,000,000
Remaining Gap $1,100,000
x Share of Res. Space Exceeding Requirement 0.50
Combined Lot Payment From Office Space Developer $550,000
Source of Funds
City Funds $0
TDR Sale Funds $3,000,000
Developer Funds (Combined Lot Payment) $550,000
Loss in Property Value $550,000
Total Funds $4,100,000
Note: The loss in property value does not involve an actual transaction between parties. It is born on 
the property owner 
Zoning Regulation: Current Washington Policy
Applied Policy
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C: Base Case of Office Development on Site 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Base Case of Office Development on Site Appendix C - 1
Property Income & Expenses Loan/Financing Assumptions
Number of Units N/A Income Side Interest Rate 5.00%
Rentable SF 142,500                    Blended Rent/SF per Month 61$                        Amortization (yrs) 20
Built SF 95% 150,000                    Blended First Year Vacancy 50% Desired DSCR 1.25
Blended Ongoing Vacancy 10% Cap Rate (in CF analysis) 5.50%
Development Period Sources Escalator (rent) 2.5%
Cash 39% 34,507,635$            Interest Earned 1% Actual LTV 56%
Deferred Dev Fee 0% -$                           Actual LTC 61%
HTC Equity 0% -$                            Expense Side
Bridge Loan 0% -$                           Escalator (cost) 2% Loan Amount 53,629,865$                 
Construction Loan 61% 53,629,865$            Property Tax per $100 of Assessed Value 1.85$                    Annual Debt Service 4,247,200$                   
     Total Dev. Period Costs 88,137,500$            BID Assessment per $100 of Assessed Value 0.111$                  
Proposed Building TAV 96,527,283$        Stablized NOI Method
Permanent Sources Management Fee 5% Stabilized NOI (Yr. 2) 5,309,001$                   
Development Equity 39% 34,507,635$            Annual DS 4,247,200$                   
Deferred Dev Fee 0% -$                           Financing Monthly DS 353,933$                      
HTC Equity (excluding last installment) 0% -$                           Construction Loan Origination Fee 1% Implied Loan Size 53,629,865$                 
Public Involvement (from any source) 0% -$                           Construction Loan Interest 5%
Mortgage 61% 53,629,865$            Bridge Loan Interest 10% LTV Method
    Total Permanent Sources 88,137,500$            Amount of Def Dev Fee 80% Stablized NOI Valuation (Yr. 2) 96,527,283$                 
HTC Pref 1% LTV 75%
Uses HTC Put (Federal Only) 5% Implied Loan Size 72,395,462$                 
Acquisition 26% 23,000,000$            Federal HTC Price 0.93$                    
Hard Costs 53% 46,650,000$            State HTC Price 0.58$                    LTC Method
Soft Costs 19% 16,350,000$            Total Cost 88,137,500$                 
Other Costs 2% 2,137,500$               LTC 70%
    Total Development Uses 88,137,500$            Implied Loan Size 61,696,250$                 
Development Period Uses 88,137,500$            Disposition Assumptions
<Less> Deferred Dev Fee -                             Year of Disposition 6
     Total Development Period Uses 88,137,500$            Cost of Sale 3.00%
Returns
Equity IRR 12%
Equity Multiple 2.x
Hypothetical Washington, DC Property - Office Development
Assumptions
Base Case of Office Development on Site Appendix C - 2
Floors 10
Leasable SF 142,500                   
Floor Space SF $/SF Annual Rent Monthly Rent
Ground Floor Retail 14,250              55.00$                      783,750$                      65,313$                     
Second Floor Office 14,250              62.04$                      884,070                        73,673                        
Third Floor Office 14,250              62.04$                      884,070                        73,673                        
Fourth Floor Office 14,250              62.04$                      884,070                        73,673                        
Fifth Floor Office 14,250              62.04$                      884,070                        73,673                        
Sixth Floor Office 14,250              62.04$                      884,070                        73,673                        
Seventh Floor Office 14,250              62.04$                      884,070                        73,673                        
Eighth Floor Office 14,250              62.04$                      884,070                        73,673                        
Ninth Floor Office 14,250              62.04$                      884,070                        73,673                        
Tenth Floor Office 14,250              62.04$                      884,070                        73,673                        
Total 142,500           61.34$                      8,740,380$                  728,365$                   
Hypothetical Washington, DC Property - Office Development
Rent Roll
Base Case of Office Development on Site Appendix C - 3
Per GSF TOTAL
Land Acquisition 153.33$             23,000,000$                 
CONSTRUCTION COSTS
     Total Hard Costs 311.00$             46,650,000$                 
     Total Soft Costs 109.00$             16,350,000$                 
     Subtotal Construction Costs 420.00$             63,000,000$                 
OTHER COSTS
     Operating Reserve 15.00                 2,137,500                      
     Subtotal Other Costs 15.00$               2,137,500$                   
Total Development Costs 588.33$             88,137,500$                 
Hypothetical Washington, DC Property - Office Development
Development Budget
Base Case of Office Development on Site Appendix C - 4
Per GSF Construction Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
INCOME
Gross Potential Income 8,740,380$             8,958,890$            9,182,862$            9,412,433$            9,647,744$            9,888,938$              
Vacancy (4,370,190)$            (895,889)$              (918,286)$              (941,243)$              (964,774)$              (988,894)$                 
Gross Effective Income 4,370,190$             8,063,001$            8,264,576$            8,471,190$            8,682,970$            8,900,044$              
OPERATING EXPENSES
Property taxes (9.52)$                   (1,428,604)              (1,457,176)             (1,486,319)             (1,516,046)             (1,546,367)             (1,577,294)                
School/MSD Taxes (0.57)$                   (85,716)                   (87,431)                   (89,179)                   (90,963)                   (92,782)                   (94,638)                     
Land Mark Decrease in Property Taxes -$                       -                           -                          -                          -                          -                          -                             
Other Expenses (7.90)$                   (1,185,680)              (1,209,394)             (1,233,581)             (1,258,253)             (1,283,418)             (1,309,087)                
Total Operating Expenses (18.00)$                 (2,700,000)$           (2,754,000)$           (2,809,080)$           (2,865,262)$           (2,922,567)$           (2,981,018)$             
(15.72)$                 
NET OPERATING INCOME 1,670,190$             5,309,001$            5,455,496$            5,605,928$            5,760,403$            5,919,026$              
Ownership Expenses
Debt Service Payments (4,247,200)              (4,247,200)             (4,247,200)             (4,247,200)             (4,247,200)             (4,247,200)                
Drawn from Reserves -                           2,499,287                 
Total ownership expenses (4,247,200)$            (4,247,200)$           (4,247,200)$           (4,247,200)$           (4,247,200)$           (1,747,913)$             
NOI ANALYSIS
NOI valuation 30,367,091$           96,527,283$          99,190,828$          101,925,970$        104,734,598$        107,618,650$          
DSCR .39x 1.25x 1.28x 1.32x 1.36x 1.39x
BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS (2,577,010)$           1,061,800$            1,208,295$            1,358,728$            1,513,202$            4,171,113$              
Disposition
Year of disposition
Gross Sale Proceeds 107,618,650             
- Selling Fees (3,228,560)                
Net Sale Proceeds 104,390,091$          
- Loan Balance (42,700,673)             
- Payment of Deferred Developer's Fee -                             
Before-Tax Cash Flow from Sale to Equity 61,689,418              
Equity Returns: Before Tax, Levered
Equity in (34,507,635)$            
BTCF from Operations (2,577,010)              1,061,800               1,208,295               1,358,728               1,513,202               4,171,113                 
BTCF from Disposition 61,689,418               
Total Cash Flow to Equity (34,507,635)$            (2,577,010)$           1,061,800$            1,208,295$            1,358,728$            1,513,202$            65,860,531$            
Projected
IRR 12.0%
Equity Multiple 2.x
Hypothetical Washington, DC Property - Office Development
Operating Cash Flow
Base Case of Office Development on Site Appendix C - 5
Loan Size: 53,629,865$       Disposition Year: 6
Rate: 5.00% Debt Payback: 42,700,673$    
Amortization (yrs): 20
Monthly payment: 353,933$            
Annual payment: 4,247,200$         
Year Period Starting Balance Payment Interest Principal End Balance
1 1 53,629,865$        353,933$            223,458$         130,476$        53,499,389$    
2 13 52,027,774$        353,933$            216,782$         137,151$        51,890,623$    
3 25 50,343,717$        353,933$            209,765$         144,168$        50,199,549$    
4 37 48,573,500$        353,933$            202,390$         151,544$        48,421,956$    
5 49 46,712,716$        353,933$            194,636$         159,297$        46,553,419$    
6 61 44,756,730$        353,933$            186,486$         167,447$        44,589,283$    
7 73 42,700,673$        353,933$            177,919$         176,014$        42,524,659$    
8 85 40,539,424$        353,933$            168,914$         185,019$        40,354,404$    
9 97 38,267,601$        353,933$            159,448$         194,485$        38,073,116$    
10 109 35,879,547$        353,933$            149,498$         204,435$        35,675,112$    
11 121 33,369,316$        353,933$            139,039$         214,895$        33,154,421$    
12 133 30,730,657$        353,933$            128,044$         225,889$        30,504,768$    
13 145 27,956,999$        353,933$            116,487$         237,446$        27,719,553$    
14 157 25,041,435$        353,933$            104,339$         249,594$        24,791,841$    
15 169 21,976,706$        353,933$            91,570$           262,364$        21,714,342$    
16 181 18,755,179$        353,933$            78,147$           275,787$        18,479,392$    
17 193 15,368,833$        353,933$            64,037$           289,897$        15,078,937$    
18 205 11,809,235$        353,933$            49,205$           304,728$        11,504,507$    
19 217 8,067,521$          353,933$            33,615$           320,319$        7,747,203$      
20 229 4,134,374$          353,933$            17,227$           336,707$        3,797,667$      
21 241 0 -$                     0 0$                    0
Note: This abbreviated table shows amortization of the loan for the first month of each year for the term of the loan
Hypothetical Washington, DC Property - Office Development
Amortization of Primary Loan
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D: Base Case of Apartment Development on Site 
 
 
 
Base Case of Apartment Development on Site Appendix D - 1
Property Income & Expenses Loan/Financing Assumptions
Number of Units 170                            Income Side Interest Rate 5.00%
Average Unit Size 750 Blended Rent/SF per Month 47$                        Amortization (yrs) 20
Leasable SF 127,500                    Blended First Year Vacancy 48% Desired DSCR 1.15
Built SF 150,000                    Blended Ongoing Vacancy 5% Cap Rate (in CF analysis) 5.00%
Escalator (rent) 2.5%
Development Period Sources Interest Earned 1% Actual LTV 55%
Cash 29,227,954$            Actual LTC 62%
Deferred Dev Fee -$                            Expense Side
Bridge Loan -$                           Escalator (cost) 2% Loan Amount 47,269,546$                 
Construction Loan 47,269,546$            Property Tax per $100 of Assessed Value 0.8500$                Annual Debt Service 3,743,497$                   
     Total Dev. Period Costs 76,497,500$            BID Assessment per $100 of Assessed Value -$                      
Proposed Building TAV 86,100,431$        Stablized NOI Method
Permanent Sources Management Fee 5% Stabilized NOI (Yr. 2) 4,305,022$                   
Development Equity 29,227,954$            Annual DS 3,743,497$                   
Deferred Dev Fee -$                           Financing Monthly DS 311,958$                      
Public Involvement (from any source) -$                           Construction Loan Origination Fee 1% Implied Loan Size 47,269,546$                 
Mortgage 47,269,546$            Construction Loan Interest 5%
    Total Permanent Sources 76,497,500$            Bridge Loan Interest 10% LTV Method
Amount of Def Dev Fee 80% Stablized NOI Valuation (Yr. 2) 86,100,431$                 
Uses HTC Pref 1% LTV 75%
Acquisition 26% 20,100,000$            HTC Put (Federal Only) 5% Implied Loan Size 64,575,323$                 
Hard Costs 57% 43,860,000$            Federal HTC Price 0.93$                    
Soft Costs 15% 11,390,000$            State HTC Price 0.58$                    LTC Method
Other Costs 2% 1,147,500$               Total Cost 76,497,500$                 
    Total Development Uses 76,497,500$            LTC 70%
Implied Loan Size 53,548,250$                 
Development Period Uses 76,497,500$            Disposition Assumptions
Year of Disposition 6
Cost of Sale 3.00%
     Total Development Period Uses 76,497,500$            
Returns
Equity IRR 12%
Equity Multiple 2.x
Hypothetical Washington, DC Property - Apartment Development
Assumptions
Base Case of Apartment Development on Site Appendix D - 2
Floors: 10
Units: 170                          
Leasable SF: 127,500                  
Floor Space SF $/SF Annual Rent Monthly Rent
Ground Floor Retail 12,750             55.00$                     701,250$                     58,438$                     
Second Floor Apartment 12,750             46.00$                     586,500                       48,875                       
Third Floor Apartment 12,750             46.00$                     586,500                       48,875                       
Fourth Floor Apartment 12,750             46.00$                     586,500                       48,875                       
Fifth Floor Apartment 12,750             46.00$                     586,500                       48,875                       
Sixth Floor Apartment 12,750             46.00$                     586,500                       48,875                       
Seventh Floor Apartment 12,750             46.00$                     586,500                       48,875                       
Eighth Floor Apartment 12,750             46.00$                     586,500                       48,875                       
Ninth Floor Apartment 12,750             46.00$                     586,500                       48,875                       
Tenth Floor Apartment 12,750             46.00$                     586,500                       48,875                       
Total 127,500           46.90$                     5,979,750$                  498,313$                  
Hypothetical Washington, DC Property - Apartment Development
Rent Roll
Base Case of Apartment Development on Site Appendix D - 3
Per GSF TOTAL
Land Acquisition 134.00$               20,100,000$                 
CONSTRUCTION COSTS
     Total Hard Costs 292.40$               43,860,000$                 
     Total Soft Costs 75.93$                 11,390,000$                 
     Subtotal Construction Costs 368.33$               55,250,000$                 
OTHER COSTS
     Operating Reserve 9.00                      1,147,500                      
     Subtotal Other Costs 9.00$                   1,147,500$                   
Total Development Costs 511.33$               76,497,500$                 
Hypothetical Washington, DC Property - Apartment Development
Development Budget
Base Case of Apartment Development on Site Appendix D - 4
Per GSF Construction Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
INCOME
Gross Potential Income 5,979,750$           6,129,244$           6,282,475$           6,439,537$           6,600,525$           6,765,538$             
Vacancy (2,849,625)$          (306,462)$             (314,124)$             (321,977)$             (330,026)$             (338,277)$                
Gross Effective Income 3,130,125$           5,822,782$           5,968,351$           6,117,560$           6,270,499$           6,427,261$             
OPERATING EXPENSES
Property Taxes (3.90)$                   (585,483)                (597,193)               (609,136)               (621,319)               (633,746)               (646,420)                  
BID Taxes -$                       -                         -                         -                         -                         -                         -                            
Other Expenses (6.02)$                   (902,517)                (920,567)               (938,979)               (957,758)               (976,913)               (996,452)                  
Total Operating Expenses (9.92)$                   (1,488,000)$          (1,517,760)$         (1,548,115)$         (1,579,078)$         (1,610,659)$         (1,642,872)$            
(9.23)$                   
NET OPERATING INCOME 1,642,125$           4,305,022$           4,420,236$           4,538,482$           4,659,840$           4,784,389$             
Ownership Expenses
Debt Service Payments (3,743,497)            (3,743,497)            (3,743,497)            (3,743,497)            (3,743,497)            (3,743,497)              
Drawn from Reserves -                         1,424,142                
Total ownership expenses (3,743,497)$          (3,743,497)$          (3,743,497)$          (3,743,497)$          (3,743,497)$          (2,319,355)$            
NOI ANALYSIS
NOI valuation 32,842,500$         86,100,431$         88,404,718$         90,769,648$         93,196,796$         95,687,782$           
DSCR .44x 1.15x 1.18x 1.21x 1.24x 1.28x
BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS (2,101,372)$          561,525$              676,739$              794,985$              916,343$              2,465,034$             
Disposition
Gross Sale Proceeds 95,687,782              
- Selling Fees (2,870,633)              
Net Sale Proceeds 92,817,149$           
- Loan Balance (37,636,519)            
Before-Tax Cash Flow from Sale to Equity 55,180,630$           
Equity Returns: Before Tax, Levered
Equity in (29,227,954)$         
BTCF from Operations (2,101,372)            561,525                676,739                794,985                916,343                2,465,034                
BTCF from Disposition 55,180,630              
Total Cash Flow to Equity (29,227,954)$         (2,101,372)$          561,525$              676,739$              794,985$              916,343$              57,645,663$           
Projected
IRR 12.0%
Equity Multiple 2.x
Hypothetical Washington, DC Property - Apartment Development
Operating Cash Flow
Base Case of Apartment Development on Site Appendix D - 4
Base Case of Apartment Development on Site Appendix D - 5
Loan Size: 47,269,546$   Disposition Year: 6
Rate: 5.00% Debt Payback: 37,636,519$    
Amortization (yrs): 20
Monthly payment: 311,958$        
Annual payment: 3,743,497$     
Year Period Starting Balance Payment Interest Principal End Balance
1 1 47,269,546$     311,958$          196,956$          115,002$        47,154,545$      
2 13 45,857,458$     311,958$          191,073$          120,885$        45,736,573$      
3 25 44,373,124$     311,958$          184,888$          127,070$        44,246,054$      
4 37 42,812,849$     311,958$          178,387$          133,571$        42,679,278$      
5 49 41,172,748$     311,958$          171,553$          140,405$        41,032,343$      
6 61 39,448,735$     311,958$          164,370$          147,588$        39,301,147$      
7 73 37,636,519$     311,958$          156,819$          155,139$        37,481,380$      
8 85 35,731,587$     311,958$          148,882$          163,076$        35,568,510$      
9 97 33,729,194$     311,958$          140,538$          171,420$        33,557,774$      
10 109 31,624,356$     311,958$          131,768$          180,190$        31,444,166$      
11 121 29,411,829$     311,958$          122,549$          189,409$        29,222,421$      
12 133 27,086,106$     311,958$          112,859$          199,099$        26,887,007$      
13 145 24,641,395$     311,958$          102,672$          209,286$        24,432,109$      
14 157 22,071,607$     311,958$          91,965$            219,993$        21,851,614$      
15 169 19,370,344$     311,958$          80,710$            231,248$        19,139,096$      
16 181 16,530,879$     311,958$          68,879$            243,079$        16,287,800$      
17 193 13,546,142$     311,958$          56,442$            255,516$        13,290,626$      
18 205 10,408,700$     311,958$          43,370$            268,588$        10,140,112$      
19 217 7,110,741$       311,958$          29,628$            282,330$        6,828,411$        
20 229 3,644,052$       311,958$          15,184$            296,775$        3,347,277$        
21 241 0$                       -$                   0$                      (0)$                   0$                        
Note: This abbreviated table shows amortization of the loan for the first month of each year for the term of the loan
Amortization of Primary Loan
Hypothetical Washington, DC Property - Apartment Development
